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Youth has a right to education in the liberal arts, in order
to be prepared for human work and for human leisure. But
such education is killed by premature specialization.'
EAN WILLARD PEDRICK recently published in the Journal of
the American Bar Association an engaging article entitled
Collapsible Specialists.' While the article ostensibly deals with
legal specialization and seems intended to dash some cold water on the
present movement in some segments of the organized Bar for more
specialist training and perhaps for the recognition and certification of
legal specialties, Collapsible Specialists is actually a somewhat loosely
constructed article with several themes: its latter half is a well-bal-
anced statement about the problem of specialization, while its first
half is concerned with the quite different problems of political leader-
ship, human wisdom and virtue; with boredom and "corrosion of the
soul,"'8 and of how specialization is seemingly related to these prob-
lems.
This small article is not a response to the latter half of Dean Ped-
rick's article for, despite its tone and its perhaps not wholly serious
asides (for instance that not even tax lawyers consider taxation a
speciality4) Dean Pedrick well knows that specialization in fact exists
and is growing,5 and that the only real questions left are what form
specialization will take and who will supervise its development and
* IRVING E. FASAN of the Illinois Bar, A.B., A.M., Fulbright Scholar, and J.D.,
University of Chicago.
1. MAsrrArN, EDUCATION AT THE CROsSROADS 64 (1943). See also GARDNER,
EXCELLENCE 43 (1961).
2. 55 A.B.A.J. 324 (1969).
3. Id. at 327.
4. Id. at 325, n.7.
5. "We know that the legal profession is moving rapidly along the specialization
trail," id. at 325.
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administration. Thus the last half of Collapsible Specialists needs
no response because it is in fact a clear recognition of the existence and
value of legal specialization and contains a sober assessment of its
virtues as well as a discussion of what form specialization might take
and who should guide its development.6
It is, however, the first portion of Collapsible Specialists that re-
quires further comment. The reason why Dean Pedrick takes up
the subject of specialization at all is because he is concerned about
political leadership in the United States: he wonders first of all why
it is that today's political leaders do not come from the ranks of the
lawyers, as such leaders presumably formerly did, and he then quickly
suggests that lawyers today are not supplying a fair share of our pres-
ent leaders because law training is too specialized. Thus Dean Ped-
rick writes:
It does seem that lawyers have been eclipsed to some extent as the leadership cadre. 7
When the great need is for generalists-for leaders who can understand, unravel and
explain to the rest of society the complexities of the modern technological and regu-
latory era and propose new directions, do we want to turn the face of the legal pro-
fession in the direction of greater emphasis on the technical and limited specialties?
• . . We agree that we don't wish to entrust the important work of governance to
legal specialists. 8
Of course, Dean Pedrick's notion about introducing some "gen-
eralist" type of training into a law school curriculum is certainly
sensible if it means only that highly practical and Bar oriented law
schools should move toward some consideration in their courses of
policies and purposes, but this position is harmful if it leads other
law schools into believing that they have a primary function which
is not practical, technical and specialist oriented. The notion that
the law and the legal profession are disciplines concerned with training
people in wisdom (assuming for the moment that this is one thrust
of Collapsible Specialists) is a dangerous one if it leads law schools
and the Bar away from training craftsmen, and especially if it bolsters
the existing reluctance of the profession to face squarely the matter
of specialization and its related problems, such as the quality of
legal education and the economic condition of the Bar.'  Unfortu-
6. 55 A.B.A.J. 324, 325 (1969). The best single statement about legal spe-
cialization is CHRISTENSEN, SPECIALIZATION ( 1967).
7. 55 A.B.A.J. 324 (1969).
8. Id. at 325.
9. See Fasan, Thoughts on Specialization and the English Experience, 3 THE
JOHN MARSHALL JOURNAL OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 66 (1970).
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nately Collapsible Specialists appears intended in part precisely to
reinforce this existing and significant resistance to legal specializa-
tion. The article's headnote, for instance, tells us:
Today, when society is searching for men of broad vision and general capabilities to
furnish leadership in our technological era, and when law schools are attempting to
broaden the academic bases of their curricula in order to retain those bright young
students who do not wish to be restricted to the conventional legal spectrum, the
American Bar Association continues to agonize over the problem of specialization.
Whom will the Bar be helping by establishing specialization?10
The answer is that the Bar has agonized too long over the obvious
and that it would seem rather clear at this point that the Bar would
only be helping itself if it would take on the task of organizing a
system of legal specialization, as indeed the practitioners are now doing
anyway on an informal basis. Like it or not the purpose of a law
school is to train craftsmen, and the great need today is to work out
some way to provide for regular specialized legal training for all those
who desire it and who can qualify for it, after our present three year
law course, which is almost exclusively academic and which cannot
provide a student with much more than sets of legal generalities."
The problem with the legal profession today is thus not too much
specialization but too little and too unsystematic specialization. The
fact that tax lawyers may be bored (or worse still, bad) men with
"corrosion of the soul"' 2 is not, as Dean Pedrick would suggest"3
because these men have been badly trained as lawyers (not trained,
that is, to be "generalists"), but because before they reached law
school these men have been poorly trained by both school and society
to be human beings.'4
10. 55 A.B.A.J. 324 (1969). While Dean Pedrick does not appear to have written
this headnote, it seems to paraphrase his thought on this point and the headnote is
something which the busy practitioner will see and read.
11. There are some currents of change. "These are some of the trends taking
shape in many of the nation's 169 law schools: ... New emphasis on clinical
work to impart practical skills, to bring students into contact with 'real people' and
to alleviate the boredom many students experience in their third year." N.Y.
Times, November 19, 1969, at 37. See also 17 THE LAW SCHOOL RECORD 30 (Uni-
versity of Chicago, 1969) for a description of their curriculum discussions, studies
and changes in this regard.
12. 55 A.B.A.J. 324, 327 (1969).
13. Id. at 325.
14. Students are bored either because university work is beyond their capacity or
because they consciously or unconsciously resent a curriculum which only describes,
counts, compares and contrasts, refusing to affirm that anything is true or false.
Forcing an individual to learn something which is wholly without relation to truth
is an act of tyranny, which most free and intelligent beings abhor. See note 23 infra.
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Of course no one can argue with Dean Pedrick if what he means to
say is merely that men ought to be educated as human beings before
they are trained as professionals. We have known that for a long
time.' 5 The flaw in Dean Pedrick's approach on this issue, however,
(and despite Dr. Hutchins and President Levi's comments as noted) is
that Dean Pedrick puts liberal education ("generalist" training) at
the wrong time and in the wrong place. It is, unfortunately, a matter
of too little and too late. Stringfellow Barr pointed out the true
problem many years ago when he said:
Since to live well, since even to earn a living, requires a man to think, liberal education
is the basic preparation for life. But it is a full-time job and cannot be carried on ade-
quately by institutions that attempt simultaneously to give occupational training and
what they may call "practical" knowledge. That kind of knowledge can be speedily
acquired, whether on the job or in a post-graduate professional school, by the man
who has learned to think. It can be acquired only with difficulty and inadequately
by the man who has not. The penalty which contemporary society has paid for omit-
ting this basic sort of education is the multiplication of highly trained specialists, who
are, fundamentally, uneducated men and who are inadequate to the varied responsi-
bilities of life.' 6
15. "In a social order fitted to the common dignity of man, college education
should be given to all, so as to complete the preparation of the youth before he
enters the state of manhood. To introduce specialization in this sphere is to do
violence to the world of youth." MARITAIN, EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS 64
(1943). The writer is also well aware that Robert Maynard Hutchins once said:
"It is sad but true that the only place in an American university where the student
is taught to read, write, and speak is the law school," HUTCHINS, EDUCATION FOR
FREEDOM 7 (1946), and that President Levi has just said: "[Wihy should law
schools . . . insist that their students have completed a four-year program before
their law study is commenced? I am not sure there is even a doubt but that
undergraduates could do just as well as graduates in formal law study. The
argument has rather been that a broad liberal arts training or perhaps a general
education was necessary to make a man or a woman a good lawyer or a public
servant. But law is a liberal arts training. It is one of the best." Levi, Education
and Legal Education, 17 THE LAW SCHOOL RECORD 5 (University of Chicago, 1969).
16. Barr, Report of the President at 14, St. John's College, Annapolis, Maryland,
July 1942, quoted in MARITAIN, supra note 15, at 64. Collapsible Specialists, as its
title indicates, is written in a somewhat jocular and imprecise fashion and perhaps it
should not be taken as seriously as we have. In a more sober moment Dean
Pedrick has said: "Certainly, there should be a high regard for the technical skills
which the profession must possess-and especially in the field of estate planning
where there are so many technical aspects. But those traditional conventional
skills can be taught in two years of a fully packed legal education. Evidence of
that fact is that the third year in law school is regarded as the year of boredom.
Why? Because not much is taught in the third year. Thus, the effort is being
made today to bring into law school training some of the skills that a lawyer ought
to have had but that he never was really formally trained to have. In the field of
estate planning, the student might be taught counseling, negotiating skills, some
knowledge about mental illness, the ability to recognize problems, etc." THE TnRD
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING 69.1924 (P. Heckerling, ed. 1969).
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There is, however, another undercurrent in Collapsible Specialists,
which, if it is one, is of an even more serious nature than placing
liberal education at the wrong point in time. And even if the
undercurrent is not at all there, reading Collapsible Specialists raises
some thoughts, and permits some comments to be made about an
aspect of contemporary life which may be worth consideration.
II
Today the young American comprehends only by accident
the intellectual tradition of which he is a part and in which
he must live: for its scattered and disjointed fragments are
strewn from one end of the campus to the other. Our uni-
versity graduates have far more information and far less un-
derstanding than in the colonial period. . . . The crucial
error is that of holding that nothing is any more important
than anything else, that there can be no order of goods and
no order in the intellectual realm. There is nothing cen-
tral and nothing peripheral, nothing primary and nothing
secondary, nothing basic and nothing superficial.I7
If one is looking for wise men, as Dean Pedrick apparently is, one
must first of all ask what wisdom is, and in this connection the dis-
turbing thing about Dean Pedrick's article is that one wonders
whether his "generalist" training has anything to do with wisdom;
one wonders, indeed, whether Dean Pedrick's "generalist" training
is really very good education at all, ill-placed though it may be.
What we need to ask is, what is the kind of education to which a man
ought to be exposed if his capacity for wisdom is to be sparked into
actuality. Although such an inquiry is beyond the scope of this
paper, one can suggest that the pre-specialized education which a
free and intelligent being such as man needs is an education which
knows that man has a nature which he shares with all other men and
for which there is a purpose or an end, namely some kind of life of
truth and goodness, and ultimately, a life of charity. 8 This educa-
17. HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 25-26. See also Dr. Hutchins' book, THE
HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA (1936).
18. "For the main point is surely to be a good man rather than to be a learned
man." MARITAIN, EDUCATION AT THE CRossRoADs, 20 (1943). In a less gentle mood
Maritain has said: "Since I have not time here to discuss nonsense (we can always
find very intelligent philosophers, not to quote Mr. Bertrand Russell, to defend it
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tion, moreover, is not a crude kind of setting up for all time of a
specific code of truths to be memorized, but still a commitment to
knowledge and ends; a firm conviction that truth exists, which con-
viction, however, is also rooted in an equally clear recognition that
truth or wisdom will be seen at each point of time and in each place
in history only imperfectly and opaquely; a commitment, therefore, if
you will, to the mystery of human knowledge through human free-
dom. 19
If on the other hand a people in their intellectual life earnestly deny
the possibility of knowledge, and therefore of wisdom, such a people
will perforce not cultivate wisdom in anyone, whether in a law school,
in a college, in a preparatory school or in life itself, except perhaps
in the very strong-willed and clear-headed, and then in them only by
chance. The rest of the people will be bored. Thus the disheartening
thing about Dean Pedrick's article is not only that he advocates teach-
ing "generalist" skills (which we have translated into the single word
"wisdom") in the wrong place, but that his "generalist" skills seem to
be exactly only that, namely skills or techniques rather than a commit-
ment to knowledge and truth. Thus Dean Pedrick talks of
analytical approaches, vocabularly, skepticism, advocacy, process-an understanding
of and a sensitivity for a sophisticated, and occasionally mystical, system of gov-
ernance. These, we believe, are "generalist skills."' 20
Now these items may indeed be "generalist" skills, but the proper
question is, as we have said, are these skills the elements of an educa-
tion for wisdom, since it is truth and wisdom which ought to be the
virtues of a leader and which are the glory of a human being.
It should of course be noted that Dean Pedrick does not use the
terms wisdom, truth or goodness, and it may be that he would be un-
comfortable in doing so, for his heroes appear to be the
[sicientists, engineers, economists, sociologists, city planners, [and] even accountants,
[who] sit with the mighty in seats occupied in former times by counsel. 2 1
most brilliantly) I am taking it for granted that we admit that there is a human
nature, and that this human nature is the same in all men." MARITAIN, MAN AND
THE STATE 85 (1951). "One purpose of education is to draw out the elements of
our common human nature. These elements are the same in any time or place ...
Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge. Knowledge is truth. The
truth is everywhere the same." HUTCHINS, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 66
(1936).
19. See MARITAIN, EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS 23 (1943).
20. 55 A.B.A.J. 324, 326 (1969).
21. 55 A.B.A.J. 324 (1969).
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Unfortunately, it is many of these men who seem more or less
rigorously committed merely to counting, classifying and describing,
while studiously suspending their judgment (so they believe) as to
whether what they are doing has any reference at all to what is true
or false, or whether what they are describing is right or wrong, since
no one really can know what is true, false, right or wrong.22 Anyway,
if indeed this is the approach of these men, shouldn't that very ap-
proach rigorously exclude them from the seats of the mighty alto-
gether, for the reason that they do not ask the most fundamental ques-
tions of all, that is to say, what is the true and what is the good. 2
The point is that Dean Pedrick's "generalist" training will be foolish
training indeed if it accepts, as it seems to accept, what appears to be
the present posture of much of our intellectual life and thus rejects a
commitment to truth and goodness and insists upon only "analytical
approaches, vocabularly, skepticism, advocacy, process. ' 24  As Mari-
tain has said in this connection:
There are people who think that it is wonderful to have a mind that is quick, clever,
ready to see pros and cons, eager to discuss, and to discuss anything, and who believe
that such a mind is that to which university education must give scope-regardless of
what is thought about, what is discussed, and how important the matter is. These
people are unaware that if they succeeded in making such a conception prevail, they
would at best transform universities into schools of sophistry. In fact, they would not
even produce sophists, who have some force, but rather disarmed and talkative minds,
that believe they are well informed but live by words and opinions. 2 5
22. See, e.g., the following: "Existentialism is not a missionary movement. It
does not promise anything. Rather, it tells us what is at stake in the task of be-
ing human. Its one claim to our attention is its shattering candor, betokened in
its starting ground rule: There is a real possibility that we live in a meaningless
world." MORRIS, EXISTENTIALISM IN EDUCATION: WHAT IT MEANS 3 (1966).
See also Geoffrey Barraclough's comments about historians in Barraclough, What Is
to Be Done about Medievel History? 14 THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 51
(1970).
23. "At the beginning of human action, insofar as it is human, there is truth,
grasped or believed to be grasped for the sake of truth. Without trust in truth,
there is no human effectiveness. Such is, to my mind, the chief criticism to be
made of the pragmatic and instrumentalist theory of knowledge. In the field of
education, this pragmatic theory of knowledge, passing from philosophy to upbringing,
can hardly produce in the youth anything but a scholarly skepticism equipped with
the best techniques of mental training and the best scientific methods, which will
be unnaturally used against the very grain of intelligence, so as to cause minds to
distrust the very idea of truth and wisdom, and to give up any hope of inner
dynamic unity." MARITAIN, EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS 13 (1943).
24. 55 A.B.A.J. 324, 326 (1969).
25. MARITAIN, EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS 53 (1943). Moreover the only
reasonable posture for these universal skeptics is silence, since everything which such
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It is rather easy (and therefore sad) to demonstrate in a crude way
that we are indeed at a state of affairs such as that which we have just
described, namely, a condition for all practical matters of universal
doubt. There is, for instance, a recent law review article26 in which
the author used the word "nature" in making a reference to "the
nature and function of [the legal] profession. ' 27  This author felt
compelled, however, to attach to his reference, by way of apology for
using the word "nature," the following footnote, presumably because
the word "nature" smacked of something fixed, something which
might be true. Listen to what this author says to his colleagues:
One does not have to believe in the existence of an immutable essence or "nature"
of law in a heaven of concepts in order to use this word, though the philosopher is
more apt than the layman to write footnotes and otherwise exhibit a certain squeam-
ishness about it. A good recent anthology of readings in the philosophy of law does,
in fact bear the title, The Nature of Law (M.P. Golding ed. 1966). That it is now
possible, as it might not have been a decade or so ago, to employ such a title with-
out automatically arousing the suspicion among philosophers that one is a "Platonist"
or worse (!) is a sign, I think, of increasing emphasis on the fact that the language
used by philosophers, besides "bewitchment of our intelligence," L. Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, No. 109 (G.E.M. Anscombe transl. 1953), is also cap-
able of liberating it. How it can do so in the field of law is the subject of the present
essay.
28
When a people have reached such a state of self-doubt about the
self-evident, there is not much possibility for wisdom left, even in its
proper academic setting. That, one submits, should be a cause of
enormous concern, but that concern does not seem to appear in
Collapsible Specialists or, worse still, the doubt about the self-evident
is accepted as an unstated assumption of the author.
persons say is ultimately and literally nonsense. Perhaps this is why Samuel Beckett
has been so well liked by certain groups. "His (Beckett's) style is a poetic mixture of
statement, omen, resonance, and mostly, silence. He deprecates words, ennobles
silence. 'Every words,' he has said, 'is like an unnecessary stain on silence and
nothingness.'" Mel Gussow, N.Y. Times, October 24, 1969, 32, Col. 4.
26. McBride, The Essential Role of Models and Analogies in the Philosophy of
Law, 43 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 53 (1968).
27. Id.
28. Supra note 26, at 53 n.6.
